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Introduction
The most common traditional epistemological problems arise from the uncertain 
nature of sense perception. According to typical skeptical argumentation, our 
knowledge-claims rely on a network of unjustified beliefs. In our natural, common 
sense attitude towards the world, we take for granted the truth of various beliefs, 
such as the fact that we are embodied beings who know various things about 
other people and the world around us by means of sense perception and reason 
for example. Skeptical arguments, such as Descartes’ methodological skepticism, 
proceed by making hypothetical counter-claims to our most basic beliefs and 
demand that in order for there to be knowledge, these hypotheses must be proven 
to be false. If we cannot justify common sense beliefs, then how can we justify any 
knowledge at all? After all, knowledge is built on true, justified beliefs, or so the 
argument goes. 
This kind of argumentation may seem quite intuitive and convincing. On the 
other hand, it is very difficult if not impossible to answer skepticism in its own terms 
1 This article is based on a revision of the paper “Arendt’s Conception of the Sense of Realness” 
that I held at the Practice, Thought and Judgment – Hannah Arendt 100 Years Anniversary 
symposium, at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Study, November 2006, as well as a revision 
of the last chapters of my master’s thesis Certainty or Faith? Arendt’s and Merleau-Ponty’s Critique 
of Cartesian Foundationalism. I thank Prof. Dana R. Villa for our interesting discussions, as well 
as his important remarks on an earlier version of this paper. I also thank Prof. Joanna Vecchiarelli 
Scott for her comments on my presentation and Prof. Richard J. Bernstein at The New School for 
Social Research for his encouragement and constructive criticism of my master’s thesis as well as 
his illuminative stories about Arendt. I also thank all the people who helped to organize the Practice, 
Thought and Judgment – Hannah Arendt 100 Years –symposium, and finally, Prof. Sami Pihlström 
for encouraging me to read Wittgenstein’s On Certainty in depth while working on my B.A thesis on 
Arendt in 2005.
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because the justifications that the skeptic demands seem impossible to satisfy. The 
most radical skeptic demands a justification not only for the epistemic propositions 
that concern knowledge in the strong sense, but also for the doxastic judgments 
that concern our most basic framework of beliefs, such as the belief that there will 
be a tomorrow or that external objects do not cease to exist when not perceived. 
The problem with epistemological foundationalism is that it attempts to answer 
skepticism in its own terms by trying to prove that there are indeed fundamental, 
indubitable beliefs that even skepticism cannot refuse to accept if it is to remain the 
serious, philosophical doctrine it claims to be. 
In this article, I will present Hannah Arendt’s twofold critique of epistemological 
foundationalism.2 I argue that there is an interesting philosophical issue at hand 
in the last sections of the Human Condition (1958) that connects this work to the 
first book of The Life of the Mind (1978). Namely, in these texts Arendt presents 
a critical reading of both traditional rationalist- and empiricist foundationalism and 
offers her own praxis-oriented philosophy as an alternative. However, due to her 
reputation as a political theorist, Arendt’s remarks on epistemology have received 
only marginal attention. Thus, Arendt’s insightful critique against what John Dewey 
calls “the quest for certainty” has remained undiscovered. In addition, Arendt’s 
powerful critique of political fundamentalism and ideology becomes merely a 
stance among other political attitudes if one does not understand that her critique 
is backed up by a sophisticated philosophical diagnosis of the logic of ideology.3 
I will at first outline Arendt’s conception of “dismantling” which aims at locating 
and disclosing problematic metaphysical conceptions that are due to a careless 
use of language and a confusion regarding the difference between various types of 
knowledge. I then move on to examine Arendt’s critique of empiricist and rationalist 
foundationalism. I show that Arendt’s critique of the grounding of knowledge in 
experience culminates in what she calls “the mathematization of nature,” which 
means that the whole of nature, including the human being, is understood as an 
object for applied mathematics, that is, as a topic for quantitative and qualitative 
analysis. I will then outline Arendt’s critique of rationalist foundationalism and show 
that her main concern with this doctrine is its neglect of language. Finally, I end 
by bringing into light Arendt’s own conception according to which language, in the 
form of speech and action, functions as the starting point of inquiry. 
2 Although Arendt herself does not use the term “epistemological foundationalism,” I take this term 
to be fruitful for describing her general critique of philosophical and political programs that aim to 
locate absolute foundations or reach a level of absolute certainty. 
3 One example of such a theoretical analysis is the chapter “Ideology and Terror” that Arendt added 
to the 1968 edition of The Origins of Totalitarianism.
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Kant and the “Crisis” in Philosophy
In the first book of The Life of the Mind, called Thinking, Arendt begins her 
philosophical inquiry with a question concerning “the end of philosophy,” in other 
words, the relationship between the Western philosophical tradition and the present 
time. Arendt reflects on famous philosophical statements such as the claim that 
God is dead, that reason is in a crisis, and finally the claim that Western philosophy 
and history have reached their final state in the self-understanding of Absolute 
Spirit. Arendt remarks that actually the context of the discussion of “the end of 
philosophy” was Immanuel Kant’s radical question concerning the possibility of any 
future metaphysics.4 She points out that the philosophical shock that Kant gave 
to Western philosophy was due to the fact that he left open the possibility that the 
capacity of reason is limited. 
Arendt claims that this challenge for philosophy divided the philosophical 
tradition following Kant. Whereas Hegel’s and the German idealists’ answer to 
Kant was to liberate the faculty of speculative reason – through a turn to absolute 
idealism – in order to abolish the dichotomy between the subjective and objective 
fields of knowledge, philosophers such as Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Jaspers, and 
Heidegger paused to think about the nature and meaning of Kant’s question for 
future philosophy. Arendt claims that it is here that the existentialist questions 
originate. That is, from what position and within what context are we able to ask 
philosophical questions and make philosophical statements in the first place? 
Arendt reflects on her own philosophical thinking in relation to Kant’s question 
and clarifies her position: “I have clearly joined the ranks of those who for some 
time now have been attempting to dismantle metaphysics, and philosophy with 
all its categories, as we have known them from Greek until today.”5 By these 
ranks Arendt refers to thinkers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, and Jaspers. She 
claims that despite the eventual crisis of reason, we have not lost our ability to 
think philosophically. Arendt remarks that what has happened is that the way 
philosophical questions have been asked, and the context in which these questions 
have been framed have become implausible.6 She further stresses the importance 
of interpretation and narration as constitutive of present philosophy. An original 
beginning (arche) cannot be located within history, since history consists of several 
4 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1: Thinking. New York: Harcourt Brace Janovich, 
1981(1978), 15–16.
5 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 212.
6 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 10–12.
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different interpretations based on contingent historical practices and events.7 One 
of the implausible philosophical doctrines that Arendt locates in the history of 
metaphysics is the leap from epistemology to ontology, of which the rational proof 
or demonstration of God’s existence is only one famous example. In her early 
essay “What is Existential philosophy?” (1945) Arendt already writes:
Kant’s refutation of the ontological proof of God’s existence destroyed any rational 
belief in God based on the proposition that anything accessible to reason had to exist 
[…]. This so-called disappearance of God from the world, the knowledge that we 
cannot rationally prove the existence of God, had as serious implications for concepts 
of ancient philosophy as it had for the Christian religion. In a godless world, man in his 
“abandonment” or his “individual autonomy” is accessible to interpretation. For every 
modern philosopher – and not just for Nietzsche – this interpretation becomes the 
touchstone for his philosophy.8
The refutation of the ontological proof had serious consequences for any 
philosophical attempts to construct a system of first philosophy. Although Descartes 
emphasized the finitude of the human intellect, the rational proof of God’s existence 
was the cornerstone that guaranteed the coherence of his metaphysical system. 
Even Kant himself finally needed God for grounding his moral philosophy. The 
echoes of a neo-Platonic conception of God still appeared as a historicized Geist 
in German idealism. What was common to these views was that they all attempted 
to ground knowledge on absolute foundations. In order to avoid infinite regress 
in the hierarchical structure of beliefs, the absolutely final ground was commonly 
conceived as an omnipotent God.9
According to Arendt, the philosophical rupture and crisis that Kant caused for 
the history of Western metaphysic did not kill thinking and philosophy. Instead 
it opened up a space for genuine self-critique and self-understanding.10 Arendt 
emphasizes that this space in the tradition of Western philosophy is something 
that every philosophical generation should cherish in order to keep critical thinking 
and philosophical dialogue alive.11 Arendt reflects on Kant’s achievement in the 
following passage:
The [ancient] unity of thought and Being presupposed the pre-established coincidence 
of essentia and existentia; that is, everything thinkable also existed, and everything 
7 Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998(1958), 273; 
Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future – Eight Exercises in Political Thought. New York: Viking 
Press, 1993(1961), 42–43.
8 Hannah Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy?” In Jerome Kohn (ed.), Essays in Understanding, 
1930–1954. New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1994(1945), 169.
9 Arendt, The Human Condition, 282.
10 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 11–12.
11 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 212.
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extant, because it was knowable, also had to be rational. Kant […] shattered that unity. 
Kant robbed man of the ancient security in Being by revealing the antinomy inherent in 
the structure of reason; and by his analysis of synthetic propositions, he proved that by 
any proposition that makes a statement about reality, we reach beyond the concept (the 
essentia) of any given thing.12
The result of this shattering of the unity of thought and Being has according to 
Arendt severe consequences for philosophy, since Kant focuses his philosophy 
especially on our conception of concepts and intuitions, in other words on the 
relation between language, thought, and the world. According to Arendt, the 
dichotomies between “mind” and “body” or the “real world” and “the apparent world” 
are not ontological distinctions, but conceptual distinctions, rooted in our use of 
language. When we realize this, we can see the superficiality of many philosophical 
dichotomies. Thus, Arendt’s dismantling of Western metaphysics consists in 
exposing philosophical trains of thought and arguments that have become so 
common that they have become a part of our everyday use of language. She sees 
efforts of this type of dismantling already in Marx’s, Kierkegaard’s, and Nietzsche’s 
writings and thus states: 
In Marx, as in the case of great authors of the last century, a seemingly playful, challenging 
and paradoxical mood conceals the perplexity of having to deal with new phenomena in 
terms of an old tradition of thought outside of whose conceptual framework no thinking 
seems possible at all. It is as though Marx, not unlike Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, tried 
desperately to think against the tradition while using its conceptual tools.13
In order to be able to localize and expose metaphysical fallacies, Arendt 
thus takes her clue from language. Paraphrasing Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations, Arendt claims in her later writings that:
“The results of philosophy are the uncovering…of bumps that the intellect has got by 
running its head up against the limits of language.” These bumps are what we have here 
called “metaphysical fallacies”; they are what “makes us see the value of the discovery.” 
Or: “Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday” (wenn die Sprache 
feiert). […] Or: “Philosophy is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by 
language.” The trouble is of course that this battle can be refought only by language.14
Arendt’s aim is to show how our use of language and its concepts affects 
our philosophical thinking. In order to be able to show this, Arendt uses both 
grammatical and etymological analyses of the use of concepts. However, she does 
not promote philosophical quietism. The so called metaphysical fallacies must 
12 Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy,” 168.
13 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 25.
14 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 115.
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not be denied or solved but instead located and revealed.15 In this way Arendt’s 
philosophical project consists in a form of a philosophical “deconstruction.”16 The 
deconstructionist method of dismantling focuses on the implicit presuppositions 
that philosophers inevitably make in their thinking. By following the philosophical 
argumentation of a chosen philosopher or a chosen philosophical doctrine to its 
limits, Arendt claims to be able to reveal strands of thought that are not visible to 
the author himself. This opens up a hermeneutical space for a critical dialogue 
between the author and the reader. 
None of the systems, none of the doctrines transmitted to us by the great thinkers may 
be convincing or even plausible to modern readers; but none of them, I shall try to argue 
here, is arbitrary and none can be dismissed as sheer nonsense. On the contrary, 
the metaphysical fallacies contain the only clues we have to what thinking means to 
those who engage in it – something of great importance today and about which, oddly 
enough, there exist few direct utterances.17
One of the main metaphysical doctrines that Arendt aims at dismantling is 
the task of grounding knowledge on certain, bedrock foundations. It is to this 
epistemological problem that I will turn to next. 
Empiricist Foundationalism and the 
Mathematization of Nature 
Arendt claims that something crucial happened with the birth of modern natural 
sciences. The ideal for the new science was the valuing and measuring of 
phenomena from an objective and neutral viewpoint.18 Arendt states that although 
empiricism advocates itself as being able to ground knowledge in experience, it is 
still dependent on the mathematical, natural-scientific methods in order to be able 
to carry out and verify empirical experiments. Thus, one of the conditions for the 
possibility of empiricist foundationalism was according to Arendt the mathematization 
of nature.19 Without the abstract and experience-independent, symbolic language 
of algebra, Newtonian physics for example could not have been possible.20
15 Hannah Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 2: Willing. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
1981(1978), 55.
16 Julia Kristeva, Hannah Arendt. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, 172; Jacques 
Taminiaux, The Thracian Maid and the Professional Thinker: Arendt and Heidegger. Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 1997(1992), 125.
17 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 12.
18 Arendt, The Human Condition, 258–259.
19 Arendt, The Human Condition, 268.
20 Arendt, The Human Condition, 265.
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According to Arendt, Galileo’s, Descartes’, and Hobbes’ fascination with pure 
mathematics distorted the distinction between the types of knowledge that pure 
mathematics and applied mathematics deal with. Because of this distortion, formal, 
exact systems could be used for measuring all types of natural phenomena, including 
human behavior.21 Arendt argues that what was forgotten in the early modern 
process of the mathematization of nature was the fact that originally, knowledge 
of mathematical objects was discovered through the practice of measurement and 
the bodily apprehension of three-dimensional space.22 
Arendt’s own position regarding the ontology of mathematics is difficult to clarify, 
since both in The Human Condition and in The Life of the Mind she presents a 
critique of the mathematization of nature but offers only scattered remarks on an 
alternative view. Also, when discussing the philosophy and ontology of mathematics, 
Arendt is at times careless with her use of language. Thus she occasionally gives 
the impression that she is promoting some form of psychologism regarding the 
nature of mathematical knowledge.23 However, if her critique of the mathematization 
of nature is read in line with her general, holistic, and pragmatic conception of 
language, in my view it seems more plausible that Arendt’s own conception would 
come closer to some form of realist structuralism in the philosophy of mathematics. 
In this way, mathematical objects such as numbers would not be conceived as 
existing as objects, but only as positions or places within a structure or a pattern. 
According to such a view, the way we come to know about mathematical objects, 
such as numbers, is through the apprehension of patterns, shapes, and series.24 
Mathematics is simply the language we use for describing simple and more complex 
structures.25 What this means is the following: the way we conceive the reality to be 
divided into structures, patterns, and objects is highly dependent on our linguistic 
capacities, such as the capability to understand and use mathematical deduction 
21 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 55–56; Arendt, The Human Condition, 45, 266.
22 Arendt, The Human Condition, 266–267. Arendt’s argumentation resembles Husserl’s view of 
the history of modern science, presented in The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1971, see especially §§8-9, §§10-13. 
However, the conclusions that Arendt and Husserl draw from the “mathematization of nature” differ in 
several important ways. For example, Arendt does not see the teleological process of the history of 
philosophy as a preparation for the transcendental reduction, as Husserl does. The interpretational 
influence underlying both Husserl’s and Arendt’s conception of the history of modern science is 
Alexandre Koyré’s work on the subject. Koyré was Husserl’s student and Arendt’s good friend. In their 
work, both Husserl and Arendt thank Koyré for his insightful remarks on the rise of modern science. 
Arendt draws her interpretation of the history of modern science also from the works of Werner 
Heisenberg and A. N. Whitehead, both of whom she quotes frequently. 
23 See especially Arendt, The Human Condition, 266–267; Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 60.
24 See Arendt, The Human Condition, 267.
25 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, The Blue and Brown Books. Oxford: Blackwell, 1958/1964, 1–2, 18–
19. In contemporary philosophy of mathematics this type of mathematical structuralism has been 
developed by Stewart Shapiro and Michael Resnik among others. See Stewart Shapiro, Philosophy 
of Mathematics, Structure and Ontology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 112–116; Michael D. 
Resnik, “Mathematics as a Science of Patterns: Epistemology.” Nous, No 16, 1982, 95–105.
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and inference. Read in this way Arendt avoids both the problematic position of 
empiricism and Platonism in the philosophy of mathematics. 
The reason why Arendt regards Galileo and Descartes as revolutionary 
philosophers is due to their way of developing and changing the Greek conception 
of geometry. In the writing of Descartes and Galileo, the original practice of 
measuring land and three-dimensional space becomes a highly abstract and 
technical enterprise.26 In agreement with Descartes’ own conception of the 
difficulties in the applicability of abstract branches of mathematics, Arendt remarks 
that the highly abstract and technical algebra no longer reflects the sensible world. 
This is because algebraic space is a technical construction, which is possible due 
to the rules of algebraic equations and the discovery of non-Euclidean space. 
However, as Descartes himself foresaw, this type of pure mathematics deals with a 
different type of knowledge than knowledge gained through perception and sense-
experience.27 For example the perception of space and motion cannot be reduced 
to mathematical terms without a significant change in meaning. 
This does of course not mean that Arendt would consider mathematical methods 
as completely insufficient for use in the natural sciences. Her point is rather that 
within the modern physicalistic conception of reality, everyday perception and 
sensation are conceived as “mere appearance” in contrast to the way things 
“really” are. This is one example of a significant change in the meaning of the 
terms “reality” and “real.” Arendt takes as her primary example Galileo’s conception 
of grounding knowledge in experience. Galileo’s famous distinction between 
“primary” and “secondary qualities of sensation” can be seen as an attempt to 
answer the problem of skepticism that rises within empiricist foundationalism. 
Galileo’s distinction makes it possible to regard the entire reality as an object for 
applied mathematics, and pure mathematics as the language through which the 
objective reality is constructed. Yet, as is the case with most forms of Platonism, 
the epistemic relationship between these two realms remains unresolved.28
As we have seen above, according to Arendt, there occurs an important shift in 
the attitude towards reality with the birth of Renaissance and the natural sciences. 
With the development of new instruments, such as the invention of the telescope 
and various other mechanical machines, philosophers and scientists lost trust in 
the accuracy of knowledge gained through “naked” sense perception.29 The so 
called “secondary sensory qualities” were now conceived as secondary to the so 
26 Arendt, The Human Condition, 264–266, 287.
27 Arendt, The Human Condition, 265, 285.
28 Arendt, The Human Condition, 283; Arendt, Between Past and Future, 56.
29 Arendt, The Human Condition, 274; Dana Villa, Arendt and Heidegger: The Fate of the Political. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996, 190.
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called “primary sensory qualities.” In fact, we can see, according to Arendt, that 
the distinction itself is superficial, since it presupposes an objective viewpoint from 
which human beings can evaluate how things really are in themselves, independent 
of our scientific practices.30 Thus she states: 
The scientists in their search for “true reality” lost confidence in the world of “mere” 
appearance, in the phenomena as they reveal themselves of their own accord to the 
human senses and reason […] The trouble is only that the discovery of the “true reality” 
behind the mere appearances remains bound to a world of appearance; he [man] 
cannot “think” in terms of what he now conceives as reality, he cannot communicate in 
language about it, and his own life remains bound to a time concept that demonstrably 
does not belong to “true reality” but […] mere appearance.31
When the whole nature is regarded as an object for applied mathematics, the 
difference between various ways of justifying knowledge becomes unclear. At the 
same time, the ancient distinction between mere belief (doxa) and true knowledge 
(episteme) appears in a new form. This is because according to empiricist 
foundationalism, true knowledge is conceived as empirically verifiable, empirically 
grounded beliefs.32 However, if these types of beliefs are to be scientifically 
verifiable, they must be factual truths.33 Empiricist foundationalism thus needs to 
somehow explain the connection between empirical knowledge and non-empirical 
knowledge, such as the laws and truths of mathematics. If knowledge is divided 
into a priori and a posteriori knowledge, the question still remains, namely, what is 
the relationship between these types of knowledge and by what means are these 
types of knowledge gained without the hypostazising of a supra-empirical realm 
of mathematical objects? The positivist distinction between analytic and synthetic 
statements merely pushes the question further. The question of verification still 
remains and thus, according to Arendt, modern, empirical science becomes a 
never-ending, self-correcting process that never reaches its own ideal of truth.34 
Yet, as we have seen above, empirical foundationalism claims to be able to ground 
knowledge in empirical experience. 
30 More recently, a similar argument has been presented also by Hilary Putnam in his article 
“Pragmatic realism.” In Jaegwon Kim and Ernest Sosa (eds.), Metaphysics: An Anthology. Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1999(1987), 591–606. Arendt and Putnam are in agreement about the general pragmatist 
view that human beings participate in the constitution of a meaningful world through action and 
the use of language. Also, both Arendt and Putnam can be said to be externalists regarding their 
conception of the status of linguistic meaning. 
31 Hannah Arendt, “The Archimedean Point.” A lecture at the College of Engineers, University of 
Michigan. The Hannah Arendt Papers at the Library of Congress, Series: Speeches and Writings 
File, 1923–1975, 1968, 7.
32 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 55.
33 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 61.
34 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 54–55.
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The Forgetting of Language in 
Rationalist Foundationalism 
According to Arendt, rationalism attempts to answer the epistemological problems 
faced by empiricism. The problem of justification that empiricism faces, may naturally 
awaken a skeptical response. Whereas empiricist foundationalism attempts to 
ground knowledge in experience, rationalism, such as Cartesian foundationalism, 
attempts to answer skepticism by means of establishing a philosophy based on 
absolutely indubitable foundations. 
One of the most discussed problems of Cartesian foundationalism is the 
methodological starting point in the first-person perspective. This problem is 
something that also Arendt discusses broadly in her writings. Due to the starting 
point of inquiry, Descartes’ meditational philosophy and later, transcendental 
phenomenology, promote a first-person authority view on knowledge. In contrast 
to empiricism, this position claims rigorous knowledge to be something essentially 
rooted in the first-person perspective of conscious experience. The apparent 
plausibility of the view comes from the fact that we seem to have a special kind of 
certainty concerning beliefs regarding our own subjective experiences, compared 
to beliefs concerning for example physical objects. Our own thoughts and emotions 
seem intimate and immediately present to our consciousness when compared to 
external objects. It is for example common that we mistake a shadow for a person, 
but we do not confuse the experience of having a headache with the experience 
of being astonished. Our inner states thus seem accessible to us in a completely 
different way than the external, empirical phenomena. 
It is also self-evident that we cannot experience other people’s thoughts or 
feelings the way we experience our own mental states. We do not hear other 
people’s thought-patterns or experience their head ache. In fact, through the use 
of various thought experiments, we seem to be able to doubt or bracket even the 
existence of other conscious beings. Thus there seems to be a deep asymmetry 
between the first-person and the third-person perspective. It is easy to draw the 
conclusion that if knowledge is to be grounded on an indubitable basis, then it 
must be grounded in the first-person perspective or the first-person plural. In 
the history of Western philosophy from Descartes onward this step is common. 
Philosophical conceptions such as the “ego,” the “subject,” the “metaphysical 
We,” the “transcendental ego,” and “transcendental subjectivity” all share the 
epistemological first-person view on various theoretical levels. According to Arendt, 
the problem here is not the emphasis on the importance of subjectivity as such, nor 
is it even the claim for a transcendental unity of the structures of consciousness. 
Instead, for Arendt the problem is that the function that some philosophers, such 
as Descartes, Hegel, and Husserl attribute to the subject or the categories and 
structures of consciousness, in terms of beliefs and knowledge about the world 
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and others, may lead to very difficult philosophical positions.35 One of the most 
difficult problems of the first-person authority view on knowledge is to explain the 
role of language in knowledge-formation. This is because language seems to be 
something essentially social and something that resists any reduction to a pure 
first-person perspective. 
Arendt points out that although perception is indeed our most important access 
to the “external” world, perception is not always accurate. Illusion and error is part 
and parcel of perception. To put it in Arendt’s words: “[e]rror is the price we pay for 
truth.”36 For example a perceived object is always apprehended by means of various 
aspects and points of view.37 In a similar way, more complex knowledge-formation 
– such as the formation of objective beliefs – is dependent on the capability to use 
a conceptual language and evaluate the testimony of others who perceive like 
me. It is here that the significance of language enters Arendt’s late philosophy in 
a novel way. Throughout The Life of The Mind Arendt tries to articulate how the 
indeterminacy of perception and the intertwining of the “subjective” and “objective” 
aspects of knowledge are also reflected in our common use of language, since 
language is an essential part of our form of life.
Arendt’s main argument against rationalist foundationalism is precisely that the 
world’s existence cannot be properly doubted or bracketed because language, 
by means of which we think, functions as the unbreakable bridge between the 
contemplating mind and the world.38 Thus Arendt claims: 
Descartes’ Cogito me cogitare ergo sum is a non sequitur for the simple reason that this 
res cogitans never appears at all unless its cogitations are made manifest in sounding-
out or written-down speech, which is already meant for and presupposes auditors and 
readers as its recipients.39
In other words, the withdrawal to the subjective realm of reflective consciousness 
presupposes the existence of a community of speakers who share a common 
world and a common linguistic system as a reference point of thought. Arendt 
claims that reflection takes its bearings from the visible world of perception and 
apprehends the structures of consciousness by means of conceptual thought. 
Resembling Jürgen Habermas, Arendt points out that thinking is always already 
intertwined with language. The intentional bond between the philosopher and the 
35 Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy,” 165–166; Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 46–47, 
89–91, 156–157.
36 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 38.
37 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 38.
38 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 102, 110.
39 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 20.
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world can never be interrupted by means of a rational method because language 
binds thought and the world.40
However, according to Arendt, we cannot really answer the question whether 
language presupposes thought or whether thought presupposes language.41 The 
two are inseparable, as I have shown above. Arendt quotes the preface of Maurice 
Merleau-Ponty’s Signs: “Thought without speech is inconceivable; ‘thought and 
speech anticipate one another. They continually take one another’s place’; they 
actually take each other for granted.”42 Whenever we want to describe perception, 
an experience, or a train of thought, we need to rely on some form of a language or 
system of signs. This can be sign language, speech, or written text, but the criterion 
is that the language is constructed through a set of common rules of use for that 
particular language. Arendt admits that we might feel that we cannot adequately 
express our most personal experiences or complex thoughts properly in any type 
of language, since the experience of thinking is very different from for example the 
experience of perceiving something or doing something practical. It may appear 
as if something essential to the experience or thinking disappears the moment it 
is brought into language. Thus Arendt asks: “Was it not precisely the discrepancy 
between words, the medium in which we think, and the world of appearances, 
the medium in which we live, that lead to philosophy and metaphysics in the first 
place?”43 Further in the first book of The Life of the Mind she states: “[t]he words 
are part and parcel of our everyday speech, and still we can give no account of 
them; when we try to define them, they get slippery; when we talk about their 
meaning, nothing stays put anymore, everything begins to move.”44 Arendt claims 
that the experience of a discrepancy does not imply that thinking or the subjective 
experiences are prior to or more authentic than speech and symbolic language. 
This is because we cannot achieve a neutral point outside language from which 
we could evaluate which is prior to the other, thought to language or the other way 
around. Linguistic concepts are adopted through learning to use flexible, historical 
language-systems. Thus, according to Arendt, meaning cannot be understood as 
an ideal, omnitemporal set of objects that have a similar existence as mathematical 
objects have according to Platonic realism. Instead, the meaning of a word arises 
40 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 110; see also Jürgen Habermas, Truth and Justification. 
Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 2003, 216.
41 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 98–99.
42 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 32; Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Signs. Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1964(1960), 17.
43 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 8.
44 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 170.
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through its use in a sentence, in a particular natural language.45 What is important 
to note, is that meaning does not exist prior to the use of some form of a system of 
signs, for example speech or complex body language. 
This is also the reason why there cannot be an authentic, transparent realation 
between consciousness (nous), the phenomenal world (phainomena), and language 
(logos). The relationship between thought and perception, between the mental and 
the physical realm, is always a relation of carrying over information by means of 
“metaphorical” language.46 This is because linguistic concepts are constituted by 
a historical community of speakers and agents. Even though reflection necessary 
“withdraws” from the world of appearances in order to be able to focus on mental 
phenomena and the structures of consciousness, the concepts of thought are 
necessarily borrowed from a common language. 
Language, the only medium through which mental activities can be manifest not only 
to the outside world but to the mental ego itself, is by no means as evidently adequate 
for the thinking activity as vision is for its business of seeing. No language has a ready-
made vocabulary for the needs of mental activity; they all borrow their vocabulary from 
words originally meant to correspond either to sense experience or to other experiences 
of ordinary life.47
The speech of the public, common world does not make speech less authentic 
than philosophical conceptual speech. In fact, the speech of the public world, 
together with body language, is the most original form of language that we know 
of.48 According to Arendt, the human form of praxis, which she calls “action,” and 
meaningful speech are the forms in which the person of a human being, “the who,” 
is disclosed.49 This is why Arendt, in line with philosophers such as J. L Austin, can 
consider even a gesture expressive. It is a form of praxis. 
[H]uman plurality is the paradoxical plurality of unique beings. Speech and action [praxis] 
reveal this unique distinctness. Through them, men distinguish themselves instead 
of being merely distinct; they are the modes in which human beings appear to each 
45 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 171–175. Arendt often uses as her example the word “house”. 
The meaning of the word is constituted through our form of life, namely, a house is characterized by 
someone living in it, dwelling in it and perhaps having it as a home. See for example Arendt, The Life 
of the Mind, vol. 1, 170–171.
46 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 102–103; Julia Honkasalo, “Praxis, Logos and Theoria – The 
Threefold Structure of the Human Condition.” Topos, No 2(19), 2008, 169–180.
47 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 102.
48 Arendt, The Human Condition, 175–181.
49 Dana Villa, Public Freedom. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008, 306.
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other, not indeed as physical objects but qua men.50 […] With word and deed we insert 
ourselves into the human world, and this insertion is like a second birth, in which we 
confirm and take upon ourselves the naked fact of our original physical appearance.51
Arendt respects the importance of philosophical, even meditative thinking, 
but she claims that the task of philosophical thinking cannot be the reaching of 
a final, absolute truth by means of intuition.52 Rather, truth is according to Arendt 
something that can only be defined within a language, in relation to a context. In 
other words, the definition of “truth” is dependent on our linguistic conventions.53 
It is far easier to verify a sentence in the field of formal logic or mathematics 
than to say which statement is true or false in for example the context of moral 
philosophy.54 Our moral norms and codes are flexible, contingent, historically and 
culturally changing. The diversity of various perspectives and aspects is according 
to Arendt that which makes discursive thought and philosophy itself possible in the 
first place. Without the capability of discursive thought, there would be no such 
thing as philosophy. No matter what type of an etymological deconstruction, it will 
not be able to penetrate the layer of language and arrive at an original, fixed, and 
authentic meaning of words. It is this ongoing insistence on contingency in Arendt’s 
writings that separates her in a significant way from Heidegger. 
Existence itself is, by its very nature, never isolated. It exists only in communication and 
in awareness of others’ existence. Our fellow men are not (as in Heidegger) an element 
of existence that is structurally necessary but at the same time an impediment to the 
Being of Self. Just the contrary: Existence can develop only in the shared life of human 
beings inhabiting a world common to them all. In the concept of communication lies a 
concept of humanity new in its approach, though not yet fully developed, that postulates 
communication as the premise for the existence of man. Within “all-encompassing” Being 
in any case, human beings live and act with each other; and in doing so, they neither 
pursue the phantom of Self nor live in arrogant illusion that they constitute Being itself.55
50 Arendt commonly uses the word “man” to denote human beings in general. It is her translation 
of the German word Mensch and is not gender specific as in man (Mann). Jeremy Kohn, “Evil and 
Plurality: Arendt Way to the Life of the Mind I.” In Larry May and Jerome Kohn (eds.), Hannah Arendt 
– 25 Years Later. Cambridge (MA): MIT Press, 1996, 174 n. 2. The reason why Arendt has added 
italics here is that she stresses the existence of man as always plural, as men. 
51 Arendt, The Human Condition, 178. Italics original.
52 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, 121–122.
53 Richard J. Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism: Science, Hermeneutics and Praxis. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983, 212.
54 Hannah Arendt, “Lying in Politics.” In Crises of the Republic. New York: Harvest Books, 1972; 
John S. Nelson, “Politics and Truth – Arendt’s Problematic.” American Journal of Political Science, 
vol. 22, no. 2, 1978, 278.
55 Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy,” 186. 
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The task of thinking is according to Arendt to aim for an understanding of things 
in order to make the world meaningful.56 It is not surprising that Arendt regards 
Socrates as her ideal thinker, since according to her, the aim of Socrates’ dialectic 
method is precisely to reach a common understanding (doxa) of a chosen topic. 
Discursive thought that borrows its concepts from an intersubjective community 
cannot reach absolute truths. It can however, accomplish an agreement. According 
to Arendt, this is why most of Socrates’ reflections remain unresolved, they end in 
aporia.57 The reason for this is that philosophical problems cannot be solved in a 
similar way as for example Euclidean geometrical problems, where the answer 
is always deducible from a finite set of axioms. The fact that the intersubjective, 
language-using community consists of a plurality of unique individuals makes 
language flexible and changing. Arendt further holds that we cannot attain an 
absolute truth of the whole reality, only particular, context-dependent truths.58 
Being itself is not knowable; it can be experienced only as something “all-encompassing.” 
This makes superfluous the ancient ontological search, which so to speak, kept a lookout 
in beings hoping to find Being, as if Being were a magical, omnipresent substance that 
makes present everything that is and that is manifest in the little word “is.”59
Trust as the Basis of Meaningful Discourse
Since meaningful discourse is dependent on our linguistic conventions and common 
rules of language-use, a meaningful language is possible due to a prior trust in the 
rationality and honesty of other persons.60 This trust is something that we actually 
take for granted in our daily action and use of language. In Arendt’s own words:
Speaking is one form of action. That is one venture. The other is: we start something. 
We weave our strand into a network of relations. What comes out of it, we never know. 
[…] And now I would say that this venture is only possible when there is trust in people. 
A trust – which is difficult to formulate but fundamental – in what is human in all people. 
Otherwise such a venture could not be made.61
Arendt’s conception of trust comes here close to the pragmatism of Jürgen 
Habermas as well as Donald Davidson’s notion of “the principle of charity.” According 
to Davidson, rational communication would not even be possible unless we always 
56 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 15.
57 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 169.
58 Hannah Arendt, “Philosophy and Politics.” Social Research, vol. 57, no. 1, 1990, 2–6.
59 Arendt, “What is Existential Philosophy,” 186.
60 Arendt, The Human Condition, 175.
61 Arendt, “What Remains? Language Remains: A Conversation with Günter Gaus.” In Jerome 
Kohn (ed.), Essays in Understanding. New York: Shocken Books, 1994, 23.
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already attributed consciousness to other people.62 Furthermore, in communication 
we always already attribute properties to the other from our own perspective. An 
understanding of the others’ intentions and thoughts would not even be possible 
without this type of radical interpretation.63 Despite significant differences in their 
argumentation, Arendt, Davidson, and Habermas all hold that the possibility of 
thinking requires several subjects who share a common world as the context of 
their language. This is also the starting point for their philosophical inquiry.
What this means for skepticism is that we can never know with absolute 
certainty that the other person is being true. In our human form of life we simply 
trust that the person is saying what she means and means what she says. Like the 
always present possibility of erroneous perception, so is there as well an always 
present possibility that the other person is lying. In other words, error and illusion 
are constitutive of what it is to be a human being. According to Arendt, due to our 
temporal structure of life, even our self-awareness is never transparent or complete. 
For example, I have a past, which is not accessible to me in the same manner 
as my present mental states.64 However, this does not imply that we could never 
form accurate knowledge concerning the world and other persons. Interestingly, 
Arendt’s conception of language-use and trust is in important ways also close to 
the conception of “belief” (Glaube) in Wittgenstein’s late philosophy, which Arendt 
had read. In the Philosophical Investigations, On Certainty and Zettel, Wittgenstein 
develops a notion of trust, which forms the basic, pragmatic basis of language-
games.65 What this means is that our basic, pragmatic beliefs frame our ways of 
responding to other human beings as conscious beings like us. This pragmatic 
trust is the condition for the possibility of communication and the formation of 
a meaningful language both for Arendt as well as Wittgenstein. However, the 
meaning of expressions is always conventional, since the way we interpret various 
expressions vary culturally. Despite this, the attitude of spontaneous trust seems to 
be a universal characteristic of the human condition. The Cartesian ideal of gaining 
absolute certainty remains an unachievable utopia precisely due to the fact that it 
is the indeterminacy and contingency inherent in the human form of life that makes 
us request for certainty and security in the first place.66
62 Donald Davidson, “The Conditions of Thought.” In J. Brandl and W. Gombocz (eds.), The Mind of 
Donald Davidson. Amsterdam: Editions Rodopi, 1989, 193–200. See also Jürgen Habermas, “Richard 
Rorty’s Pragmatic Turn.” In Robert Brandom (ed.), Rorty and His Critics. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, 44–
49.
63 Davidson, “The Conditions of Thought,” 198–199.
64 Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 1, 203; Arendt, The Life of the Mind, vol. 2, 12–13.
65 Ludvig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations: The German Text with a Revised English 
Translation. Oxford: Blackwell, 2004(1953), § 420; Ludwig Wittgenstein, On Certainty – Über 
Gewissheit. Oxford: Blackwell, 1974(1969), §§ 94, 115, 257; Ludwig Wittgenstein, Zettel. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1981(1967), §§ 481–483.
66 Richard J. Bernstein, The Abuse of Evil: The Corruption of Politics and Religion since 9/11. 
Cambridge: Polity Press, 2005.
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Conclusions
In various texts, Arendt writes about empiricist and rationalist foundationalism as 
two sides of the same coin and claims that knowledge cannot be grounded on a set 
of indubitable or foundational beliefs. This does not mean that knowledge gained 
through empirical sciences is implausible or that we could not receive accurate 
information of our mental capacities by means of reflection and introspection. 
Rather, Arendt is critical of the general project of finding a set of basic, non-
inferential beliefs that would ground other types of belief. This is because according 
to her, our way of justifying beliefs is context dependent. Furthermore, the quest 
for knowledge and the quest for meaningfulness are not to be confused with each 
other. Some basic forms of knowledge simply cannot be proven beyond doubt 
because these types of belief-systems function as the pragmatic framework for 
our sense of reality and thus for gaining knowledge in the first place. The focus 
of Arendt’s critique against epistemological foundationalism is the conception of 
certainty modeled according to the exact, mathematical sciences and the division 
of knowledge into “true knowledge” (episteme) and “mere belief” (doxa). Her 
critique culminates in the neglect of the role that language plays in knowledge 
formation. Thus, by examining Arendt’s twofold critique of foundationalism, it 
can be seen that questions related to knowledge formation lead her to explore 
language in novel ways. Whereas in her early writings Arendt focuses mainly on 
political foundationalism and its totalitarian consequences, in her later writings, 
such as The Human Condition and The Life of The Mind, we see how Arendt 
works out the theoretical roots underpinning the hierarchical distinction between 
the practical (Vita Activa) and the philosophical (Vita Contemplativa), which is one 
of the reasons that make the logic of totalitarian ideologies seemingly plausible in 
the first place. Since for Arendt philosophy can no longer be held as the “queen of 
the sciences” that dictates how other sciences should proceed methodologically, 
we should according to her see philosophy instead as a form of critical practice that 
makes us see that our scientific truths as well as moral doctrines are contingent, 
open to critical debate, and thus, most importantly, fallibilistic. Perhaps it is partly 
due to these insights that despite her vast philosophical analyses, Arendt always 
referred to herself as a “political thinker,” not a philosopher. 
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